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Introduction 
The 1990s witnessed a heated debate among political theorists regarding the 
extent to which social justice requires the fair distribution of resources versus 
the recognition of group differences.1 While scholars advocating for a politics 
of recognition never underestimated the need for an equitable distribution of 
                                                 
 
* A slightly modified version of this paper is forthcoming in Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the 
Futures of Europe (ed. Uta Staiger and Benjamin Martill, UCL Press, 2017). The paper updates 
the argument presented in Ch. 5 of my book, Europe’s Functional Constitution. A Theory of 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) in light of Britain’s 
subsequent decision to leave the European Union (“Brexit”). I am grateful to Uta Staiger and 
Benjamin Martill for their helpful feedback on an earlier draft, and to Robert Y. Shapiro for a 
helpful conversation on the Eurobarometer survey results cited here. I would also like to thank 
Hjalte Lokdam for enabling its publication as an LEQS working paper. 
1  The distinction between the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition is 
famously drawn by Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ 
Condition (Routledge, 1996), Part I. Alongside Fraser, the most well-known proponents of this 
line of argument include Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jacob T. Levy, Multiculturalism of Fear (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of 
Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the 
Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). For two very different 
critiques of the politics of difference, see Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian 
Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Seyla 
Benhabib, Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 
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wealth, they pointed out that unjust social hierarchies do not always track 
socioeconomic ones. Symbolic, cultural, and identitarian dimensions of social 
value can also produce patterns of exclusion. Reducing social justice to a matter 
of wealth redistribution, they argued, makes liberal political philosophy 
insensitive to racial, gendered, cultural, and ableist dimensions of privilege and 
privation. 
Something of the dichotomy between redistribution and recognition is at play 
in the current debate over explaining support for populist movements and 
leaders across the West and beyond. While some observers maintain populism 
draws its energy from long-term post-industrial economic malaise that has 
been neglected by mainstream parties,2 others point to anxiety over loss of 
cultural primacy on the part of formerly dominant groups.3 Still others regard 
these dynamics as inextricable: while contemporary populism typically 
(though not invariably) manifests itself as a form of identity politics,4 it reflects 
a misdirected backlash against insecurities perpetuated by the capitalist 
economic order. Still others take a wider lens, attributing the wave of populist 
                                                 
 
2 Herbert Kitschelt, The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995); Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz, “Globalization, the 
welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe,” Socio-Economic Review, vol.1 (2003), 
no.2, pp. 215–245; Rod Dreher, “Trump: Tribune of Poor White People,” (interview with J.D. 
Vance), The American Conservative, July 22 2016.  
3 Martin Schain, “Immigration and Changes in the French Party System,” European Journal of 
Political Research, vol. 16 (1988), no.6, pp. 597-621; Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism 
in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Pierre Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in 
Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Rachel K. Gibson, The Growth of Anti-
Immigrant Parties in Western Europe (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002); Ronald F. 
Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series No.26, August 2016. 
4 For a clear contrast between inclusive and exclusive tendencies of populism in Latin America 
and Europe, respectively, see Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. 
Inclusionary Populism,” 48 Government and Opposition, vol. 48 (2013), no.2, pp. 147-174. 
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success to a general erosion of public commitment to democratic values and 
procedures.5 The debate sparked by the British electorate’s narrow decision to 
leave the European Union illustrates the cleavage between identitarian and 
socioeconomic explanations in particular: while some view the Brexit vote as a 
flashpoint for anti-immigrant sentiment and, more broadly, as a bid to restore 
national sovereignty, others describe it as a manifestation of socioeconomic 
insecurities that establishment parties have failed to address. 
Populist movements have also gained ground in such formerly steadfast 
members of the Union as France, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and 
Poland. Many, though not all, of these movements incorporate anti-EU 
messages into their platforms. What could and should the EU’s response be to 
the rising tide of populist politics? Are there steps the EU could take to allay 
the concerns that energize these movements? Or are such steps, particularly if 
they require giving greater powers to EU institutions, likely to add fuel to the 
fire? Clearly, the answer will depend on which accounts of populism’s rise we 
find most compelling. Nonetheless, it is worth considering whether the EU is 
equally well-equipped (or ill-equipped) to respond to identitarian grievances 
as it is to socioeconomic ones. 
 
(i) The European project as a socioeconomic solution 
to identity politics 
At its origins, the European integration project was a response to identity 
politics. Supranational institutions represented an attempt to disarm and 
sublimate the national rivalries that had riven the continent. They were 
                                                 
 
5 Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic 
Disconnect,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 27 (2016); No. 3, 5–17; Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha 
Mounk, “The Signs of Deconsolidation,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28 (2017), No.1, pp. 5-15 
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designed not only to order the relationships among member-states on the basis 
of rules, promote cooperation, reciprocity, and mutual trust, and generate a 
sense of shared interest, but also to reduce the appeal of nationalism for the 
masses by generating greater prosperity through cooperation. Economic 
interdependence would raise living standards, establish disincentives against 
autarky and jingoism, and defuse the economic insecurity and privation that 
had fueled extremist ideologies on the right and the left during the interwar 
period. Writing in 1943 in Algiers as a member of the French Committee for 
National Liberation, Jean Monnet argued, 
There will be no peace in Europe if states rebuild themselves on the basis of 
national sovereignty, which brings with it the politics of prestige and economic 
protectionism. If the countries of Europe protect themselves against one 
another again, the constitution of vast armies will again be necessary… 
European states are too constrained [étroits] to guarantee their peoples the 
prosperity that modern conditions make possible and consequently necessary.6 
According to Monnet, politics and trade are interlocked in a feedback loop that 
can be vicious or virtuous: when states are goaded by nationalist sentiments 
into a “politics of prestige,” they jettison the benefits of foreign trade for 
protectionist policies that leave their citizens worse off and which can escalate 
into armed conflict. By contrast, free economic exchange is capable of easing 
the conflictual dispositions of the nationalist frame of mind. Accordingly, a 
supranational scheme that eliminated protectionism and attenuated states’ 
ability to mobilize core industries of warfare would also mitigate the 
destructive potential of mass mobilization.7 As Robert Schuman put it in his 
                                                 
 
6  Jean Monnet, Note de Réflexion de 5 août 1943. Translation adapted from 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/note_de_reflexion_de_jean_monnet_alger_5_aout_1943-fr-b61a8924-
57bf-4890-9e4b-73bf4d882549.html 
7 Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 128 
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May 9th Declaration of 1950, integration would bring about a general “fusion of 
interests” and “a wider and deeper community between countries long 
opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.”8 Inspired by interwar plans 
to place the Ruhr and Lorraine heavy industries under multinational control,9 
the initiative of a European Coal and Steel Community was symptomatic of 
this distrust of the nation-state. The ECSC was hardly inspiring to ordinary 
citizens, but it was not meant to be. Monnet conceded that “increased coal and 
steel production is not the basis of our civilization.”10 Rather, his incremental 
strategy of sovereign commitment was meant to marshal instrumentally 
rational calculations to keep nationalist passions in check. Furthermore, it 
supplied a workable framework of supranational governance whose 
legitimacy was based on technocratic competence. Although Monnet himself 
spurned the idea of market integration, the subsequently negotiated European 
Economic Community (EEC) repurposed the institutions he had designed. 
Most importantly, defining the immediate scope of integration in technocratic 
terms enabled the EEC to circumnavigate the jealously guarded shoals of 
national sovereignty on which more ambitious federalist projects such as the 
European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community 
(EPC) had foundered.  
Accordingly, supranationalism was precisely an attempt to resolve the conflicts 
generated by early 20th century nationalism by using the lure of technocracy. 
The Monnet/Schuman prescription was to wean European nations off the 
                                                 
 
8 Robert Schuman, Declaration of May 9th 1950. Available at http://www.cvce.eu/  
9 William Diebold, “A Personal Note,” in Klaus Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 
1950/51 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988), 27  
10 Jean Monnet, Speech to the Common Assembly of the ECSC, Strasbourg, 12 January 1953 in 
Jean Monnet, The United States of Europe Has Begun. The European Coal and Steel Community 
Speeches and Addresses 1952–1954 (University of Pittsburgh Archive of European Integration, 
microfiche, Paris 1955), 17 
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opioid of identity politics by offering technical and economic rewards. 
Meanwhile, member states could jealously guard their sovereign prerogatives 
until the imperatives of the market led them seamlessly into a fully-fledged 
political union. In sum, the European integration project represents a 
socioeconomic solution to the problem of identity politics. 
The reason Monnet’s gambit worked for as long as it did is because nobody in 
the two generations following World War II was in danger of forgetting that 
the economic project was ultimately about creating a peaceful and stable 
political order on a congested continent prone to political radicalism. The cost 
of his strategy, however, was to depoliticize supranational decision-making as 
far as possible. By substituting economic pay-offs for principled support for 
integration, it neglected the long-term need to generate sustained public 
engagement in the European project. Over time and with the expansion of 
supranational power, however, this strategy has become unsustainable. As 
supranational institutions have acquired greater decision-making authority 
from member states, it is proving increasingly difficult to explain why those 
institutions must be so far attenuated from citizen control. Having been 
excluded from the decisions that drew them into an ever-closer union, 
European publics are contesting the arrogance of technocracy by supporting 
irreverent parties and movements. Meanwhile, because their legitimacy is 
predicated on little more than “you’re better off thanks to the EU,” 
supranational institutions experience every crisis of competence, every 
economic slump, as an existential crisis.  
Ironically, the crises of competence that the EU has experienced over the past 
decade threaten to undo some of the hallmark achievements of decades of 
European integration, not least the relationships of solidarity and mutual trust 
among member states. The crisis that ensnared Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) for the better part of a decade starting in 2009 perfectly 
Turkuler Isiksel 
   7 
illustrates this problem. For starters, EMU failed the test of competence insofar 
as it amplified the effects of the global financial and sovereign debt crisis rather 
than cushioning them, impeded recovery and growth rather than promoting 
the same, and brought high unemployment and widespread privation to many 
member states rather than raising living standards. Second, the rigid 
constraints it imposed on domestic fiscal policies not only deprived national 
legislatures of key levers of social policy, but also further attenuated 
democratic control of policy-making at the domestic level. This, in turn, has 
exacerbated voter disenchantment with the political process and fueled 
support for anti-establishment parties.  
Third and most important, the social and distributional consequences of 
monetary union have tapped into subterranean veins of nationalist animus, 
reanimating grievances dormant since Europe’s dark century of civil war. The 
euro crisis has opened up fault lines between creditor and debtor states, the 
former insisting on fiscal prudence, and the latter struggling to meet their 
repayment and structural reform obligations while providing basic social 
assistance to their citizens. Disagreements over culpability, crisis management, 
and institutional reform have frayed the social consensus required to keep the 
integration project going. In other words, the distributive conflict and sense of 
insecurity generated by the euro crisis has reactivated identitarian cleavages in 
Europe. If socioeconomic anxieties and identity politics are indeed mutually 
reinforcing, then the EU as it is currently configured exacerbates both. 
 
(ii) Could a Social Europe dampen the appeal of 
identity politics? 
Clearly, the EU has in significant respects failed to make good on its promise 
to mitigate the ravages of global casino capitalism, particularly insofar as its 
institutional configuration favors price stability and fiscal conservatism, 
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emphasizes monetary policy over public spending, and resists attempts to re-
embed the market in a matrix of social protection.11 The fiscal coordination that 
allows the EMU to function has steadily tightened, along with the disciplinary 
apparatus attached to it. Member states are required to coordinate their 
economic policy cycles and ensure the conformity of their economic priorities, 
budgetary choices, and structural reforms with strict EU rules. The legislative 
and constitutional adjustments necessitated by the crisis have corralled 
member states into a protracted austerity zone, forcing them to pare down 
public spending, and with it, the social protections they afford their citizens.12 
Rather than bolstering the capacity of member states to protect their vulnerable 
domestic constituencies against the pressures of global economic 
interdependence, the EU has worked to exacerbate these pressures.  
Part of the reason for this is that the EU lacks the fiscal capacity necessary to 
provide compensatory or redistributive programs of its own. Although the 
Preamble of the EEC Treaty expressed the desire of signatory states to promote 
the “improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples” and 
“ensure [the] harmonious development [of their economies] by reducing the 
differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the 
less favored regions,” it did not create the institutional structure required to 
                                                 
 
11 The metaphor of embedding is borrowed from Karl Polanyi, who characterizes the dynamics 
of modern capitalist society as a “double movement” whereby market forces strain against 
regulatory measures by which the state seeks to contain its deleterious effects on society. Karl 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 1944 [2001]), 136-8 
12 Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Hans Vollaard, “Implementing Social Europe in Times of 
Crises: Re-established Boundaries of Welfare?” (2014) 37 West European Politics 677; Caroline 
de la Porte and David Natali, “Altered Europeanisation of Pension Reform in the Context of 
the Great Recession: Denmark and Italy Compared” (2014) 37 West European Politics 732; OECD 
Directorate for Employment, Labour, and Social Affairs, “Social Expenditure Update” 
(November 2014). Available at http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expenditure-
Update-Nov2014-8pages.pdf  
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further these commitments. 13  According to the postwar consensus on the 
“compromise of embedded liberalism,”14 multilateral institutions promoting 
trade and financial liberalization would be counterbalanced by strong domestic 
institutions guaranteeing social cohesion and compensating those 
disadvantaged by international economic competition.15 In the classic formula 
coined by Robert Gilpin, embedded liberalism meant “Smith abroad” and 
“Keynes at home.”16 In the European Economic Community, member states 
retain the prerogative of providing the social protections necessary to cushion 
the impact of greater market competition. In the ensuing decades, integration 
in the social domain has been clipped by member states’ insistence on 
preserving their prerogatives over national welfare provision.17 With limited 
power to issue binding rules, and lacking any significant redistributive 
capacity, the EU’s role in this area has been limited to benchmarking objectives, 
articulating best practice, and comparatively assessing outcomes. As a 
consequence, “the course of European integration from the 1950s onward has 
created a fundamental asymmetry between policies promoting market 
efficiencies and those promoting social protection and equality.”18 Although 
the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon enumerated the building of a “competitive social 
                                                 
 
13 This passage rephrases the ECSC Treaty’s preambular pledge to “raise the standard of living” 
by expanding productivity. See also, Maas, “The Genesis of European Rights” 1018. 
14 Stefano Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Labour Law 
Perspective (Rita Inston tr, Cambridge University Press 2006) 16. 
15  John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order” (1982) 36 International Organization 379. 
16 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton University Press 1987) 
355. 
17 Stephan Leibfried, “Social Policy: Left to the Judges and the Markets?” in Helen Wallace, 
Mark A Pollack, and Alasdair R Young (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (7th edn, 
OUP 2015). 
18 Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ 
(2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 645, 665. 
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market economy” 19  among the EU’s aims, and listed justice and solidarity 
among its founding values,20 it nevertheless preserved the domestic basis of 
welfare provision, thereby creating a “disjunction . . . between lofty Treaty 
proclamation[s] and lack of law-making instruments.” 21  Similarly, while it 
introduced means for the EU to “encourage cooperation” between member 
states on social policy, it left it up to member states to design, implement, and 
fund it.22 Although the EU was subjected to a new general obligation to “take 
into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of 
employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against 
social exclusion,” it was not given any new powers with which to carry out this 
mandate.23 Instead, it was merely enjoined from stepping on member states’ 
toes as they walked a tightrope between the socioeconomic needs of their 
citizens, on the one hand, and the imperatives of market liberalization, on the 
other. Since the 1990s, a growing chorus of scholars has expressed concern that 
the singular emphasis on market integration and competitiveness is eroding 
the domestic social protections and delicate corporatist bargains that define the 
European social model.24 In sum, Social Europe has unquestionably made far 
less headway than Market Europe. 
                                                 
 
19 Art 3(3) TEU. Emphasis added. 
20 Art 2 TEU. 
21 Mark Dawson and Bruno de Witte, “The EU Legal Framework of Social Inclusion and Social 
Protection: Between the Lisbon Strategy and the Lisbon Treaty” in B. Cantillon, H. 
Verschueren, P. and Ploscar (eds), Social Inclusion and Social Protection in the EU: Interactions 
Between Law and Policy (Intersentia 2012) 54. 
22 Art 153(1) and (2). 
23 Art 9 TFEU. 
24 Especially, Fritz Scharpf, “Economic Integration, Democracy, and the Welfare State” (1997) 4 
Journal of European Public Policy 18; Claus Offe, The Democratic Welfare State. A European Regime 
Under the Strain of European Integration IHS Political Science Series no 68 (Institute for Advanced 
Studies 2000); Claus Offe, Europe Entrapped (Polity 2015); Wolfgang Streeck, “Competitive 
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For some, these circumstances doom the European project. The EU’s stark pro-
market bias, the ever-tightening constraints around domestic public spending 
and social assistance, and the democratic attenuation of supranational 
decision-making have led some left-leaning observers to argue in favor of 
reverting to the national Eden of social democracy.25 In his influential “Left 
Case for Brexit” published shortly before the June 2016 vote, British political 
philosopher Richard Tuck railed against the EU as “a constitutional order 
tailor-made for the interests of global capitalism and managerial politics.”26 
Tuck contends that the EU “has consistently undermined standard left policies 
such as state aid to industries and nationalization.” The only way to regenerate 
social democracy, in his view, is to reclaim domestic parliamentary 
sovereignty. To bolster his point, Tuck recalls that Marx admired the House of 
Commons as the only political institution capable of introducing socialism by 
democratic means, without revolutionary confrontation.  
If there was one thing Marx understood well, however, it was that capitalism 
is a global force that cannot effectively be countered on domestic terrain alone. 
                                                 
 
Solidarity: Rethinking the ‘European Social Model’” in Karl Hinrichs, Herbert Kitschelt, and 
Helmut Wiesenthal (eds), Kontingenz und Krise: Institutionenpolitik in Kapitalistischen und 
Postsozialistischen Gesellschaften. (Campus 2000); Alexander Somek, Individualism. An Essay on 
the Authority of the European Union (Oxford University Press 2008); Augustín José Menéndez, 
“European Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become More 
Human but Less Social?” ARENA Online Working Paper No .11 (ARENA 2009). Available at 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-papers/2001-
2010/2009/WP11_09_Online.pdf  
25 See Alan Johnson, “Why Brexit is Best for Britain: The Left-Wing Case,” The New York Times, 
March 28, 2017; Neil Davidson, “The Socialist Case for Leave,” The Jacobin, June 22, 2016. 
Although he is a trenchant critic of Economic and Monetary Union, Wolfgang Streeck argues 
for a European Bretton Woods system that would allow greater fiscal heterogeneity rather than 
national autarky. Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time. The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, 
trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 2014), 188. 
26  Richard Tuck, “The Left Case for Brexit,” Dissent, June 6, 2016. Available at 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/left-case-brexit  
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This insight is more compelling than ever today, when the lives of individuals 
everywhere are increasingly subject to political, social, and economic forces 
that elude the control of any one state. Although the world is carved up into 
nominally sovereign territorial units, the most formidable policy challenges are 
transnational. Global economic and financial shocks, forced population 
movements, transnational criminal networks, environmental degradation and 
climate change make national self-sufficiency an elusive aspiration. To be sure, 
transnational challenges do not come with obvious global (as opposed to local, 
national, or regional) solutions. However, if we are to understand society as a 
“cooperative venture for mutual advantage,” then this venture no longer 
wholly follows the contours of the sovereign, territorial state.27 While it is not 
clear that supranational political units can easily reenact the bonds of solidarity 
necessary for making social justice work, 28  it is increasingly difficult for a 
political community on the scale of nation-state to effectively address the 
challenges that affect its citizens. Particularly from the viewpoint of economic 
production and consumption, the world already looks like a cosmopolis.29 The 
EU’s promise today is that it is an institutional attempt, however modest, to 
catch up with that reality. 
And the EU has been remarkably successful at resisting some of the 
deregulatory or disembedding pressures occasioned by global economic 
interdependence, even if it hardly gets the credit it deserves in this regard. For 
instance, it upholds stringent public health and consumer protection standards 
over the vociferous objections of its trading partners and against WTO rules. 
                                                 
 
27  Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, Revised edn. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979 [1999]), 131 
28 David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Polity, 2000), esp. pp.81-96 
29  Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the 
Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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This means voters must either rethink their Euroscepticism or overcome their 
aversion to hormone-treated beef. Similarly, many member state citizens may 
find a new appreciation for the overbearing judges of the Court of Justice if 
they value the privacy of their personal data in the age of mass surveillance, 
Facebook, and Google.30 On such issues, the size of its single market lends the 
EU leverage over its trading partners and multinational corporations far 
beyond what member states acting singly could command. These modest 
achievements suggest that the only effective way for states to “take back 
control” in the face of the vicissitudes of economic globalization is to work 
within the framework of supra- and international institutions. Furthermore, it 
is only through such arrangements that the benefits and burdens of global 
economic exchange can ultimately be shared in more equitable ways. While 
critics like Tuck and Streeck are correct to observe that the EU is far from being 
the optimal vehicle for a fairer socioeconomic order, it has a key advantage over 
better, more ambitious schemes: it exists. However difficult to achieve, 
redesigning or re-equipping an institutional framework that already exists is a 
likelier prospect than building one from scratch. 
If we accept that identity politics can be defused by addressing economic and 
class-based insecurities, and that nation-states are no longer capable of 
upholding generous social welfare provision given the vagaries of global 
casino capitalism, then the EU’s supranational policy-making framework 
                                                 
 
30  For instance, the Court of Justice invalidated the Data Retention Directive of 2006 for 
disproportionate interference with the rights to privacy and data protection enshrined in the 
EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and 
Seitlinger and others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, 8 April 2014. Similarly, it held that the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive entailed a “right to be forgotten”: in this case, an entitlement to the removal 
of personal data from search engines. Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), and Mario Costeja González, 13 May 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
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might not only be a remedy; it might be the only available remedy. The EU not 
only has the institutional apparatus for making and enforcing policy, it also has 
substantial fiscal resources that go towards agricultural subsidies, cohesion 
funds, and emergency financial assistance. To be sure, its powers in the domain 
of social policy stand in need of significant expansion, but this calls only for a 
repurposing of its existing institutional capacity and material resources away 
from market-oriented goals towards socially-oriented policies.  
In this regard, Brexit may clear one pesky logjam. In making the left case for 
Brexit, Tuck neglects to note that the UK has consistently obstructed the 
development of a more muscular EU social policy and redistributive capacity. 
Britain’s long-standing insistence on a free market model of European 
cooperation is an essential reason why European integration has proceeded 
along precisely the neoliberal track Tuck laments.31 Insofar as there is a “left 
case for Brexit,” then, it is primarily that of removing the one hurdle among 
many that has hampered attempts by continental social democrats from 
correcting the EU’s free market bias. 
Sadly, however, even if we accept that only a renewed emphasis on social 
welfare and fair redistribution could redeem the EU in the eyes of citizens, this 
does not mean that such changes will be popular or feasible. Hunger is not 
bread, as Jeremy Bentham quipped. In decades past, the project of redressing 
the EU’s pro-market bias with a stronger social agenda would have needed to 
await an alignment of left-wing governments among an influential group of 
member states. Alas, such an alignment may be a long time coming, and not 
                                                 
 
31 See especially Jan-Werner Müller, “Europe’s Sullen Child,” London Review of Books, vol.38, 
no.11, 2 June 2016, pp.3-6; Wolfgang Streeck, “Where are We Now? Responses to the 
Referendum,” London Review of Books, vol.38, no.14, 14 July 2016, though Streeck maintains that 
“the neoliberal revolution, led by the US and the UK, has for ever closed [the] window” for 
building a supranational welfare state. 
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only because the EU is larger and more diverse. The most important reason 
why a Social Europe remains more elusive than ever is the dwindling power of 
left parties in most member states. In states like France, Germany, Britain, and 
Denmark, populist movements have capitalized on working class hostility to 
the EU and lured away some of the very constituencies that predictably buoyed 
the left-wing vote.32 As a result, the pendulum that used to swing between the 
left and right sides of the political spectrum now oscillates precariously 
between moderate and extreme right.33  
Moreover, insofar as the fiscal and sovereign debt crisis has strengthened 
Euroscepticism,34 understood as support for “parties and movements actively 
                                                 
 
32 Sheri Berman, “The Lost Left,” Journal of Democracy, vol.27, no.4, October 2016, pp. 69-76; 
Martin Rhodes, “Labour Markets, Welfare States and the Dilemmas of European Social 
Democracy,” in Michael Keating and David McCrone, The Crisis of Social Democracy in 
Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
33 Berman, “The Lost Left,”73 
34 Emmanuele et al. find that in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, Eurosceptic 
parties have thrived in response to the Eurozone crisis, but only in member states that possess 
what they characterize as a permissive political and institutional context, which includes a fluid 
party system and low barriers to electoral inclusion. Furthermore, they argue that Eurosceptic 
parties have found disproportionate success in wealthy, creditor countries on the one hand, 
and in beleaguered debtor countries, on the other, and have done less well in countries with 
middling economic performance. Vincenzo Emmanuele, Nicola Maggini, and Bruno Marino, 
“Gaining Votes in Europe Against Europe? How National Contexts Shaped the Results of 
Euroskeptic Parties in the 2014 European Parliament Elections,” Journal of Contemporary 
European Research, vol.12 (2016), no.3, pp. 697-715. Magalhães chalks up the rise in votes for 
Eurosceptic parties to discontent with domestic austerity policies and, in some cases, protest at 
the lack of policy differentiation between traditional left and right parties. Pedro C. Magalhães, 
“Bailout Countries and Others in 2014: Austerity and Government Defection,” in Mark N. 
Franklin and Julie Hassing Nielsen (eds), The 2014 European Parliament Elections: Second 
Order or Second Rate? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). In a study of 108 national and European 
elections between 2008 and 2015, a period roughly spanning the duration of the euro crisis, 
Nicoli finds that negative growth and high employment are particularly important predictors 
of the rise in electoral support for Euroscepticism. Francesco Nicoli, “Hard-line Euroskepticism 
and the Eurocrisis: Evidence from a Panel Study of 108 Elections Across Europe,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 55 (2017), no.2, pp. 312-331. In the domestic context, Barbieri 
argues, that “several Eurosceptic parties – such as the Danish DF, Greek Syriza, the French FN 
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calling for a reduction of EU competences, if not for a simple dismantlement of 
the institutions,” 35  it has undermined the likelihood of any such major 
reorientation. Laudable though they are, the objectives of redressing the EU’s 
lopsided reliance on market mechanisms and distributing the benefits and 
burdens of European integration more evenly require greater delegation of 
powers to the European Union. Paradoxically, then, the very failures that 
warrant a leftward reorientation of the European project have made that 
reorientation less likely to succeed.  
It ought to give us pause that the plan for refashioning the EU into a 
supranational social democracy dovetails with Monnet’s apolitical strategy of 
integration. Both seek to diminish the purchase of identity politics by 
improving material standards of living. By the same token, both are vulnerable 
to the same problems of technocracy, economism, and democratic attenuation. 
Shifting the EU’s priority from market regulation to social justice is politically 
difficult, but not unimaginable. But social justice is not the same thing as social 
democracy, and it is gratuitous to assume that, once created, a supranational 
welfare state would acquire the strong underpinnings of an engaged and 
invested citizenry. The optimistic expectation of European federalists in the 
1990s was that a genuine constitutional re-founding would catalyze a vibrant 
European demos and meaningful democratic opinion- and will-formation at the 
                                                 
 
and the UKIP – received the most votes in their respective countries in the EP election, and 
others – such as the Italian M5S, the Latvian LNNK, and the Polish PiS – secured second place.” 
He concludes that “these parties were able to move away from the niche positions they have 
typically held in the electoral market and, thereby, became influential players in the national 
political arena.” Giovanni Barbieri, “Eurosceptic Party Performances in the 2014 European 
Elections,” featured on The European Parties, Elections, and Referendums Network blog, 22 
June, 2015. Available at https://epern.wordpress.com/2015/06/22/eurosceptic-party-
performances-in-the-2014-european-elections/  
35 Nicoli, “Hard-line Euroskepticism and the Eurocrisis,” 315 
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supranational level.36 If the failure of the EU’s attempt to stage a constitutional 
moment showed anything, it was that democratic publics cannot be summoned 
by incantation. Similarly, the persistence of voter apathy towards European 
elections despite the amplified power of the European Parliament37 suggests 
that it is futile to adopt a Field of Dreams approach (“if you build it, they will 
come”) to animate new representative institutions with democratic life. 
 
(iii) What if there is no socioeconomic remedy for 
cultural anxiety? 
Furthermore, it is far from clear that identity politics signify nothing more than 
misdirected socioeconomic anxiety. If the appeal of populism is irreducible to 
a crisis of the relations of production, and instead stems from worry over 
cultural displacement, then nothing short of the recognition of identitarian 
demands can satiate its constituencies. If the latter diagnosis is accurate, 
moreover, assuring greater economic security and a fairer distribution of 
wealth will do little to boost the EU’s popularity. In fact, insofar as the EU 
fosters a conspicuous new cosmopolitan elite that speaks multiple languages 
and cashes in on foreign degrees, facilitates the movement of people, and 
accelerates the intermingling of cultures, it exacerbates identitarian anxieties. 
The fact that the Brexit campaign successfully exploited the public conflation 
of intra-EU free movement and the admission of refugees originating in the 
Middle East and Africa to amplify its message illustrates this issue. The free 
                                                 
 
36 Jurgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other (Ciaran Cronin C and Pablo de Grieff eds, MIT 
Press 1998), 161 
37 Turnout in European Parliament elections has declined from 62% in 1979 (the first year of 
direct elections) to >43% in the 2014 elections, even though the powers of the EP have been 
enlarged in successive treaty changes over the same period. See 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html  
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movement of persons heightens the sense that European integration is a 
conspiracy to eliminate nation-states rather than an attempt to reinforce their 
efficacy and to patch up the “leaky vessel” of national democracy. 38 
Furthermore, if we take the demands expressed by today’s populist 
movements at face value, the EU’s cardinal sin is not that of standing in the 
way of social justice, but of eroding the cultural cohesion and solidarity of the 
national political unit. As political theorists cautioned in the 1990s, 
redistribution is not necessarily an appropriate response to the politics of 
recognition. 
Take Estonia, a country of about 1.3m people that acceded to the EU in 2004. 
According to the 2011 Estonian census, 12.7% of the Estonian population 
consists of first-generation immigrants, with an additional 12% Estonian-born 
persons of at least partial immigrant background. 39  Individuals of Russian 
origin constitute a majority of these groups. By contrast, non-European 
migrants in Estonia add up to less than 2% of the total population. 40  For 
instance, the total number of Estonian residents hailing from an African 
                                                 
 
38 Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, cited in Peter Lindseth, “Author’s Reply: ‘Outstripping’, 
or the Question of ‘Legitimate for What?’ in EU Governance” (2012) 8 European Constitutional 
Law Review 153, 163. Also see Alan Milward, European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd edn 
(London: Routledge, [1992] 2000), 2 
39 “Population and Housing Census 2011,” Statistics Estonia News Release, No.80, June 21, 
2013. Available at http://www.stat.ee/dokumendid/70026  
40  Statistical Database of Estonia, “Population and Housing Census 2011 - Native and 
immigrant population (data of several generations),” 31 December 2011, updated on June 21, 
2013. Available at Statistical Database, Population and Housing Census 2011 - Native and 
immigrant population (data of several generations), 31 December 2011, updated on June 21, 
2013. Available at http://www.stat.ee/sdb-update?db_update_id=13687. This number was 
obtained by calculating the total number of persons originating in European and EU states 
other than Estonia, and subtracting them from the general population of Estonian residents.  
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country of origin counted in the 2011 census was a paltry 414,41 while just 32 
individuals were from Afghanistan or of Afghan heritage. 42  Estonia’s 
population growth has been negative for a long time: emigration outstripped 
immigration for 14 of the past 16 years.43 Despite its relative ethnic and racial 
homogeneity and isolation from worldwide refugee flows, however, 70% of 
responses from Estonia mentioned immigration as one of the two most 
important issues facing the European Union in the Autumn 2016 
Eurobarometer survey.44 (The second most important issue, highlighted in 40% 
of responses, was terrorism, despite the apparent lack of a significant terrorist 
threat against Estonia.)  
Perhaps those surveyed were thinking of immigration as a challenge to the EU, 
rather than to their own country. After all, the 18 months preceding this survey 
had seen an EU-wide spike in asylum applications and bitter controversy 
among EU member states over apportioning responsibility for processing 
them. While Estonians appeared disproportionately disquieted by terrorism 
compared to the EU-28 average, they were joined by citizens of member states 
such as the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Cyprus in expressing heightened 
concern with this issue.45 By contrast, only 20% and 17% respectively among 
                                                 
 
41 Ibid. The category used in the database search was “PC0521: POPULATION, 31 DECEMBER 
2011 by Sex, Place of residence, Parents’ country of birth / Region, Country of birth and Ethnic 
nationality”. Search query included persons of foreign and Estonian birth whose parents’ 
country of birth was one of the countries listed in the region of Africa. 
42 Ibid. Search query included persons of foreign and Estonian birth whose parents’ country of 
birth was Afghanistan. 
43 Based on data between 2000-2016. “The Population of Estonia Increased Last Year,” Statistics 
Estonia News Release, No.8, January 16, 2017. Available at https://www.stat.ee/news-release-
2017-008.  
44  European Commission, Directorate General for Communication, Public Opinion in the 
European Union, First Results. Standard Eurobarometer Survey No. 86, Autumn 2016, 7. 
45 Eurobarometer Survey No. 86, 7. 
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the EU-28 ranked “the economic situation” and “member state finances” as one 
of the top two issues facing the EU.46 For their part, UK respondents were 
within a few percentage points of the EU-28 average in terms of their priorities. 
When asked about the two most important challenges facing the EU, Brits 
ranked immigration first at 42%, terrorism second at 26%, and economic 
situation third at 24%.47  
 Puzzlingly, however, when EU citizens were asked about the top two 
challenges facing their own country, economic concerns such as 
unemployment, housing, pensions, and rising cost of living took center stage.48 
Although immigration was the second most frequently mentioned item across 
all member states at 26%, the combined share of socioeconomic issues 
highlighted by respondents is 122%. 49  And when asked what two most 
important issues they personally faced, most cited the cost of living, pensions, 
and financial security.50 Here, too, Brits were representative, ranking rising 
prices, health and social welfare, their country’s economic situation, and 
pensions as the most important issues affecting their personal lives.51 
                                                 
 
46 Eurobarometer Survey No. 86, 7. 
47  Eurobarometer Survey No. 86, 7. Interestingly, in the May 2016 Eurobarometer survey 
conducted just 6 months earlier, more UK survey responses flagged immigration (at 51%), 
alongside 38% for terrorism. (European Commission, Directorate General for Communication, 
Public Opinion in the European Union, First Results. Standard Eurobarometer Survey No. 85, 
Spring 2016, p.7) The steep drop in UK respondents reporting worry over immigration and 
terrorism relative to the EU-28 suggests that the British electorate’s decision to leave the EU in 
the intervening period may have assuaged some of the UK public’s anxiety over these issues. 
48 Eurobarometer Survey No. 86, 11. 
49 Because the survey allows each respondent to give more than one response (respondents 
may choose up to two top issues from a list), the total percentage share of issues adds up to 
190% across the EU-28 in the Autumn 2016 survey.  
50 Eurobarometer Survey No. 86, 13. 
51 Eurobarometer Survey No. 86, 13. 
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These survey results suggest that when it comes to their own lives, a majority 
of EU citizens are most immediately worried about their living standards. As 
it happens, economic prosperity is also the EU’s top priority, given that its core 
competences relate to trade, competition, market regulation, and price stability. 
Puzzlingly, however, citizens associate the EU with a markedly different set of 
challenges—immigration and terrorism—which raise anxieties about the 
intrusion of disruptive, alien ‘others’ into their political communities. 
Apparently, Britons and Estonians and Cypriots and Czechs regard the EU less 
as a sphere of economic opportunity, personal mobility, and geopolitical 
security, and more as an overcrowded boat floating precariously in terrorist-
infested waters. It is no wonder, then, that significant constituencies in these 
countries want to distance themselves from a Union they associate with 
insecurity.  
Of course, how far these distorted optics are due to the EU’s own failures of 
competence and how far they should be attributed to willful distortion by 
political actors for domestic political advantage remains a matter for debate. 
However, the EU itself is hardly in a position to mount an effective response to 
the misperceptions. The way that European integration has been packaged and 
sold over generations has encouraged popular estimation of its value solely in 
terms of euros and cents. Meanwhile, European societies are once more in the 
grip of the kind of identity politics that decades of carefully constructed 
economic relationships were supposed to obviate. If the EU is ill-equipped to 
meet this challenge, it is not so much because of its bias in favor of deregulation, 
as leftist critics contend, but because the only tools at its disposal for doing so 
are of an economic nature. For this reason, it is unclear whether an alternative, 
social democratic model of supranationalism would do much resolve the 
discontents of identity politics. In fact, since such a project would require 
vesting the EU with even greater power and fiscal capacity, it is likely to have 
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the opposite effect, at least in the near term. Trying to defuse identity politics 
with redistributive politics at the supranational level could be like trying to fix 
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